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Pay-to-Delay Settlements:
The Circuit-Splitting Headache

Plaguing Big Pharma
ABSTRACT

At its passage, the Hatch-Waxman Act was hailed as a
much-needed step in making generic drugs more readily available to
consumers, easing some of the heavy burdens placed on consumers by
the necessary, but flawed, patent system that essentially granted
brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers a de facto economic
monopoly over their drugs. One consequence of the Act, unforeseen by
legislators and regulators, was the creation of a perverse incentive on
behalf of pharmaceutical patent holders to pay alleged patent
infringers substantial cash payments to delay entry into the particular
drug market.
These pay-to-delay settlements-or reverse-payment
settlements-have been at the center of a prolific debate among
economists, legal theorists, regulators, and various industry experts on
the appropriate relationship between antitrust law and patent law.
This troubling byproduct of the Hatch-Waxman Act has also slowly
created a definitive split among the federal circuit courts over the past
ten years. The conflict is now coming to a head as the Supreme Court
reviews the legality of reverse-payment settlements in FTC v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals.
This Note recommends that the Court recognize
that, by removing the patent validity testing from the courtroom to the
settlement negotiation table, the patentee-plaintiffs also removed
themselves from the protection against antitrustscrutiny that a patent
provides. As such, certain evidence of reverse payments should give
rise to a rebuttablepresumption of an illegal restraint of trade, given
its clear anticompetitive implications.
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Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter
how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
1
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
- J. Marshall

One unintended byproduct of the Hatch-Waxman Act (Act) is
the emergence of "reverse-payment" settlements-or "pay-to-delay"
manufacturers
settlements-between brand-name-pharmaceutical
and generic-pharmaceutical manufacturers.2 Under Hatch-Waxman,
a generic manufacturer could win a patent challenge by establishing
that the patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic company's
competing drug.3 If the generic manufacturer prevails, it stands to
gain early entrance and a market duopoly with the patent owner in

1.
2.
CONSUMERS
pdf.
3.

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Marshall, J.).
FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY FOR DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
BILLIONS 3 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.
Id.
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the market for the patented drug. 4 Such a win could effectively
"reallocate billions of dollars from producers to consumers[,]" because,
by keeping lower-priced generic drugs off the market, drug companies
are able to charge higher prices than they otherwise could.5
Reverse-payment settlements allow drug companies to maintain high
prices by inducing resolution of patent infringement claims out of
court. 6 Essentially, the owner of the drug patent agrees to pay a
generic drug manufacturer to refrain from marketing a competing
version of the patented drug during the term of the patent as an
alternative to challenging the patent via litigation.'
Reverse-payment settlements illustrate the quintessential
conflict between patent law and antitrust law.8 While a patent license
grants its owner wide latitude in protecting his monopoly entitlement,
courts have developed antitrust law to reduce the negative effects of
use of monopoly power.9 On the other hand, courts have traditionally
interpreted such laws broadly, allowing significant discretion in
application and enforcement. 10 For reverse-payment settlements, the
antitrust issue arises when two competing drug makers settle a patent
suit before trial with a substantial cash payment from the patent
holder to the generic manufacturer." Such a transaction decreases
competition by eliminating the possibility of earlier competition in
that drug market, denying consumers the benefit of lower prices. 12
Importantly, it is the large cash payment from the patent owner to the
generic manufacturer, not the litigation settlement in and of itself,
that renders the transaction anticompetitive. 1 3 This is because the
payment allows the generic manufacturer a de facto share of the
4.
Id.
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
5.
RegulatoryDesign Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1558 (2006).
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supranote 2, at 2.
6.
7.
See id.
Cf. Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1555-56 (summarizing the "stark" conflict between
8.
the means of antitrust law and those of patent law).
See id.
9.
10.
See id. at 1555 ("A law referred to as 'the Magna Carta of free enterprise' can hardly
be expected to determine the results of particular cases." (footnote omitted)).
11.
See id. at 1557.
12.
See id.
Professor Hemphill notes:
13.
Privately optimal agreements that impose large negative effects upon nonparties
frequently raise antitrust concerns.... Economic modeling has shown formally that
settlements that include a cash payment from the patentee to the infringer provide
consumers with less welfare, on average, than seeing the litigation to completion. The
conclusion that this loss gives rise to an antitrust violation depends upon acceptance
of the view, on which these models are premised, that consumers are entitled as a
matter of antitrust law to the average benefits of litigation.
Id. at 1572-73 (footnotes omitted).

916

VANDERBILT J OFENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:4:913

profits from the patented drug. 14 Furthermore, these "sweetheart
deals" are often accompanied by other concessions from the
brand-name patent holder, such as granting the generic company an
exclusive secondary license to sell the drug before the end of the
patent term or agreeing to refrain from selling the drug after the
patent expires, giving the generic company a brief monopoly. 15 Such
benefits compound the anticompetitive effects of reverse-payment
settlements. 16
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has strenuously opposed
these pay-to-delay deals as anticompetitive and ultimately harmful for
US consumers.' 7 And, due to the 2008 shift in administration and the
subsequent shift in department leadership, the Antitrust Division at
the US Department of Justice (DOJ), though it initially wavered in its
stance toward pay-to-delay settlements, ultimately adopted a firm
stance opposing pay-to-delay deals.1 8
The FTC continues to
demonstrate its contempt for pay-to-delay deals by challenging the
settlements in court, claiming restraint of commerce under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 19 Courts have generally allowed drug

14.
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 394
(2003) ("A hallmark of these anticompetitive agreements is that the patentholder agrees to share
its monopoly profits with the challenger in order to induce the challenger to give up its fight. In
the merger context this is clear: the challenger is paid the acquisition price. A bald payment not
to compete is even more explicit (and more difficult to justify)." (emphasis added)).
15.

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN

FTC STUDY 25 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
16.
Cf. id.
17.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 1-2. The FTC asserts that
'"[p]ay-for-delay' agreements are 'win-win' for the companies: brand-name pharmaceutical prices
stay high, and the brand and generic share the benefits of the brand's monopoly profits." Id. at 1.
But consumers will "miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than
brand prices." Id. The FTC recommends that "Congress should pass legislation to protect
consumers from such anticompetitive agreements" because "[p]ay-for-delay agreements have
significantly postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic drug prices." Id. at 2.
18.
Brent Kendall, DOJ Shifts Policy on Generic Drug Patent Settlements, WALL ST. J.
(July 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124691728092502381.html ("In a public split
between the agencies, the Justice Department under the Bush administration did not embrace
the FTC's viewpoint that the deals violated antitrust laws. The department's change in position
under the Obama administration goes a long way toward resolving that split."). Subsequently,
Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General at the DOJ Antitrust Division, pledged the
department's full support of the FTC's position against reverse-payment settlements. Id. She
stated that "[Chairman Leibowitz] can count on the support of the Department of Justice as he
goes forward and pursues [actions against reverse-payment settlements]." Confirmation
Hearings on FederalAppointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
758 (2009) (statement of Christine Varney, nominee for Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice).
19.
Many challenges resulted in settlement with the FTC. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003) (outlining the BuSpar consent decree); In re Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2001 WL 333643 (F.T.C. Apr. 2, 2001) (noting the Cardizem CD consent
decree); In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000) (discussing the
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companies to settle a drug patent challenge, however, so long as the
settlement does not keep the generic drug off the market beyond the
patent's scheduled expiration. 20 Because settlements have not been
shown to restrict competition beyond what the patent itself had
insulated, courts have hesitated to apply antitrust analyses and
instead have relied on the "scope of the patent" rule. 2 1
On July 16, 2012, however, the US Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit explicitly declined to follow prior decisions from the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits on the legality of
reverse-payment settlements. 22 Rejecting the use of the scope of the
patent test, the Third Circuit employed the stricter quick-look "rule of
reason" analysis to find that "any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market
[is] prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade."2 3 This
Third Circuit ruling created a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit
on the exact same patent infringement litigation settlement involving
the Merck-owned patent for K-Dur. 24 Congress has remained silent on
the issue, neglecting to restrict reverse-payment settlements by
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act. 2 5
The recent circuit split and congressional inaction induced the
US Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review the reverse-payment
settlement issue. In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted cert
in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, a pay-to-delay case where the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC's argument that pay-to-delay
settlements violated antitrust laws and reaffirmed the use of the scope

Hytrin consent decree). In contrast, the brand-name manufacturer of the drug K-Dur and the
first generic firm to file an ANDA together chose to litigate rather than settle with the FTC, and
they won. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058-62 (11th Cir. 2005).
20.
Under the scope of the patent test, reverse-payment settlements are deemed
permissible so long as (1) they do not exceed the scope of a patent, (2) the patent holder's patent
infringement claim was not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud.
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Applying this test, three circuits have declined to invalidate patent litigation settlements so long
as the delay of entry does not exceed the scope of the challenged patent. See id. (holding that the
scope of the patent test applies, after analyzing the circuit split on the issue); see also In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005) (utilizing the scope of the patent
test); Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076 (applying the scope of the patent test). But see In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the rule of reason
test to find the reverse-payment agreement at issue per se illegal).
21.
E.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1336; see cases cited and
discussion supra note 20.
22.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012); see infra Part I.C.
23.
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
24.
Id. at 211-12.
25.
See infra Part I.D.
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of the patent test to determine the validity of pay-to-delay
settlements. 26 A decision is expected by the end of June 2013.27
This Note examines the history of reverse-payment settlements
as well as antitrust and patent law principles to provide both judicial
and extrajudicial solutions for the reverse-payment phenomenon. Part
II provides a detailed background on reverse-payment settlements,
including the regulatory scheme surrounding reverse-payment
settlements, the FTC and DOJ viewpoints on the legality of
reverse-payment settlements, congressional attempts to resolve the
issue, and the key cases interpreting the legality of reverse-payment
settlements. Part II also provides a detailed analysis of the judicial
standards adopted by each of the federal courts of appeals reviewing
reverse-payment cases and an analysis on the strengths and weakness
of those approaches. Part III recommends that the Supreme Court
adopt a hybrid approach that addresses the entitlement rights of
patent law and consumer protection concerns of antitrust law. Part
IV, however, asserts that congressional action will ease the tension
between the two bodies of law and resolve the issue more effectively
and comprehensively than judicial resolution. Part V concludes with a
summary of potential solutions, highlighting the need for clarity and
practicality when dealing with patents and antitrust concerns
together.

I. BACKGROUND: THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act was the impetus for
the surge of reverse-payment settlements. 28
Since its inception,
pharmaceutical patent holders and generic drug manufacturers have
found a haven within which the parties can arrange a mutually
beneficial financial arrangement where the generic drug manufacturer
delays competing against the patent holder in production and sale of
its drug for substantial payments. 29 Both of the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies (DOJ and FTC) have taken a clear stance
against the use of reverse-payment settlements by patent holders to
26.
Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Supreme Court to Hear 'Pay-for-Delay' Drug Case,
THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/
2012/12-_December/USSupremeCourtohear-pay-for-delay-drug-case.
27.
Id.
28.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2; see also Legislative and Regulatory Responses to
the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry in the PharmaceuticalMarketplace: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel,
FDA); id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)
("[A]nticompetitive behaviors [were] made possible in part by the sometimes complex and
admittedly confusing text of [the] law.").
29.
See Hemphill, supranote 5, at 1557.
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extend their market exclusivity and profit stream.30 Many courts that
have ruled on the issue have taken a different (oftentimes radically
different) stance regarding the legality of such agreements.3 1
Furthermore, Congress has made multiple attempts, but ultimately
has failed, to provide a legislative solution to the growing concern
regarding the anticompetitive nature of such settlements. 32
A. The Regulatory Scheme: Hatch- Waxman Act
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides the
regulatory framework under which pharmaceutical manufacturers
must operate. 33 In order to sell a new drug, an applicant must
undertake an extensive application process that includes multiple
phases of clinical trial testing, substantial development costs, and a
resource- and time-intensive review and approval process.

34

Because

of this lengthy process, a patented drug may not even reach the
market until after a considerable portion of its patent term already
has expired. 35 Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, potential competitors
had significant disincentives from participating in the New Drug
Application (NDA) process required by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act 36 because they had low prospects of obtaining patent
rents. 37
Furthermore, generic manufacturers were barred from
developing a competing product that would be ready to market once
the patent expired.3 8
As a result of the competition-stifling regulatory scheme,
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to promote the availability
of generic drugs in the pharmaceutical market and to incentivize

30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part I.B.
See supra note 20; infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).

34.

See, e.g., U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS,

&

RISKS, AND REWARDS 1 (1993), available at http://www.fas.org/otalreports/9336.pdf ("The full
aftertax cost of [R&D for each new drug], compound[] to thel value on the day of market
approval, was roughly $194 million (1990 dollars)."); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003)
(estimating similarly calculated costs at $802 million per drug).
35.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 15, at 4. See generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
36.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
37.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2.
38.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (explaining patent infringement); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra
note 15, at 4.
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research and development of competing drugs.3 9 Under the Act, a
generic drug manufacturer can "piggyback" off of the patent owner's
NDA data by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and
showing that its generic drug is a "bioequivalent" to the patented
drug. 4 0 These provisions can significantly reduce the amount of time
and resources required to obtain FDA approval. 41
More important to the issue of reverse payments, the Act
provides generic drug competitors incentives to challenge existing
drug patents before they expire. 4 2 Under the Act, an ANDA applicant
can file a "Paragraph IV" certification where the applicant asserts that
the patent it is challenging is either invalid or would not be infringed
by its version of the drug. 43 Upon receipt of the Paragraph IV
certification, the patent owner has forty-five days in which to file a
patent infringement suit against the Paragraph IV filer. 44 Because
the Paragraph IV filer is protected from infringement liability so long
as it has not begun marketing the drug, however, the generic drug
manufacturer's risk profile is completely inverted.4 5 It now stands to
lose very little by challenging the patent. 46

39.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 15, at 4. The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed as the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360 (2006); 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)).

40.

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).

41.
See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 617-18 (2011) (estimating the cost of preparing and
filing an ANDA to be $1 million).
42.
See id. at 618.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355()(2)(A)(vii)(IV). This is referred to as a "Paragraph IV"
43.
certification because it falls under the fourth paragraph of the relevant statutory section. The
ANDA filer also can elect to file under paragraphs I-III, which entail a certification that the
branded manufacturer failed to file the required "Orange Book" listing of the patent, the patent
has expired, or approval is being sought effective on a date after patent expiration. See id.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III). In fact, most ANDA filers do not elect to file under Paragraph IV. See
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 41, at 618.
44.
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C).
45.
Note that the Paragraph IV filer faces minimal liability for infringement if the filer
does not market the product because there generally are no damages if the product was never
sold. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic PharmaceuticalCompetition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 264 (2012). Once the
infringement litigation is initiated by the patent owner, the patent owner stands to lose
much-its patent. But because the filer has not yet marketed the product, the generic
manufacturer stands to gain significantly from the litigation-the prospect of marketing its
generic version of the patented drug (due to a noninfringement or invalidity verdict) plus a 180day exclusive license to sell the generic drug. See id. If the patent owner does not initiate an
infringement suit within forty-five days of the ANDA grant, the filer is then free to market the
drug without fear of liability for infringement damages. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV),
(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
46.
See discussion supra note 45.
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In fact, the first filer of a Paragraph IV certification against a
particular patented drug stands to receive a 180-day period of market
exclusivity should the application succeed-a sort of reward or
incentive for being the first challenger to a pharmaceutical patent. 47
This presents another opportunity for generic manufacturers to
receive a significant windfall from settling their infringement dispute
with the patentee. 48 The 180-day exclusivity period begins to run
when the first challenger's generic drug enters the market.49
Therefore, as part of the settlement, generic companies may agree to
refrain from entering the market and "park" their exclusivity in
exchange for monetary consideration, not only preventing themselves
but also other generic manufacturers from entering the market.5 0
B. The Enforcement Agencies: The FTC and DOJ Weigh In
Historically, the FTC's Competition Bureau and the Antitrust
Division at the DOJ have espoused conflicting stances on the legality
of reverse-payment settlements. 51
The FTC consistently and
strenuously
opposes
reverse-payment
settlements
as
an
anticompetitive practice and engaged in multiple lawsuits and other
enforcement actions to invalidate such agreements. 52 The FTC insists
that "[p]ay-for-delay agreements have significantly postponed
substantial consumer savings from lower generic drug prices."5 3
The DOJ, on the other hand, initially blessed reverse-payment
transactions as the patent holder's legitimate enforcement of its
rights. 54 Under the Bush administration, the DOJ refused to join the

47.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I).
48.
See Morris, supra note 45, at 272.
49.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I).
50.
The first generic competitor to file an ANDA is given a 180-day exclusivity period
during which no other generic manufacturer may market an equivalent generic drug. See id.
§ 355(j)(5). However, the exclusivity period does not begin to toll until the filer actually begins to
market the drug, or a judicial finding of patent invalidity or noninfringement, nor does the
exclusivity grant expire, once granted. See id. This allows an ANDA filer to "park" its exclusivity
power to prevent other generic manufacturers from also challenging the same patent through the
same process. See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2003). This creates an incentive for both the generic
manufacturer and the patent holder to settle its infringement litigation with payment for the
generic manufacturer's delay of entry, which would prevent the start of the 180-day exclusivity
period and block other generics from the market until the patent expires or they choose to obtain
FDA approval through the traditional NDA process, which is effectively cost prohibitive. See id.
51.
See supra notes 17-18.
52.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supranote 2, at 1-2.
53.
Id. at 2.
54.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273); Kendall, supra note 18.

922

VANDERBILT J. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:4:913

FTC in its enforcement actions against these agreements.5 5
To
illustrate, the DOJ filed an amicus brief in Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, where it stated that "a settlement involving restrictions on the
sale of the products in question is not necessarily impermissible" when
dealing with patents because there are competing policy concerns. 56
The DOJ urged that the court must strike a balance between the right
to exclude granted by the patent and the Hatch-Waxman goal of
facilitating challenges to weak patents, but it did not advance a
standard by which the court should decide.57
However, with the change in administration, both at the White
House and within the leadership structure in the Antitrust Division,
the DOJ began to take a less friendly view toward reverse-payment
settlements, though still more equivocal in its stance than its
antitrust enforcement counterpart, the FTC.58 At the invitation of the
Second Circuit, the DOJ filed an amicus brief in Arkansas Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, where it articulated its new
stance. 59 In its brief, the DOJ asserted that "[t]he anticompetitive
potential of reverse

payments .

agreements should be treated

.

. is

sufficiently clear that

such

as presumptively unlawful under

Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 60

The DOJ added that "[1]iability

properly turns on whether, in avoiding the prospect of invalidation
that accompanies infringement litigation, the parties have by contract
obtained more exclusion than warranted in light of that prospect."61 It
added an important caveat: that the parties may defeat the
presumption of unlawfulness if the payment afforded in the
agreement does not exceed estimated litigation costs. 6 2 Because the
DOJ believes that private parties' right to contract should be
respected when developing a policy regarding reverse-payment
settlements, it generally advocates broader exceptions to the
presumption of illegality. 63

55.
See Kendall, supra note 18.
56.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S.
919 (No. 05-273).
57.
See id. at 10-11.
58.
See Kendall, supra note 18.
59.
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation at 9-10, Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-2851-cv(L),
05-2852-cv(CON), 05-2863-cv(CON)).
60.
Id. at 10.
61.
Id. at 25.
62.
Id. at 28.
63.
Id. at 19-21, 27-32.
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C. The Case Law: Reverse Payments on the Continuum of Legality
The case law regarding reverse-payment settlements is
definitively split on the balance between patent rights and antitrust
concerns. 64 This stark difference is illustrated in the contradictory
stances taken by the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit on the
same reverse-payment settlement for the same drug patent, K-Dur.
Three other courts of appeals-the Second, Sixth, and Federal
Circuits-have ruled on the issue, also splitting on the balance
between the interests of the patent holder and the value of antitrust
enforcement.
1. The K-Dur Litigation: A Tale of Two Circuits
The litigation over the K-Dur patent settlement represents a
rarity-a circuit split between two different courts of appeals over a
single case or transaction. 65 In a private antitrust enforcement suit, a
group of wholesale and retail buyers of K-Dur, a blood pressure
medication, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Merck, the owners of the
K-Dur patent. 66 The challengers argued that the settlement terms
entered into by Merck and generic manufacturers of K-Dur violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlaws unreasonable
restraints on trade. 67 The agreement provided that, without conceding
"the validity, infringement, or enforceability of the '743 patent, [the
generic manufacturer] would refrain from marketing its generic
potassium chloride supplement or any similar product" in exchange
for a cash payment of $60 million over three years from the patent
holder, Schering.6 8 The US District Court for the District of New
Jersey ruled against the plaintiffs, using the scope of the patent test. 69
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit held on appeal that any
payment to a generic challenger who had agreed to delay entry into
the market was "prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade."70 To overcome this presumption, the patent owner must then
prove that the deal was for a purpose other than postponing market

64.
See infra Part I.C.
65.
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012); Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005).
66.
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 202, 203 n.2.
See id. at 206-09.
67.
68.
Id. at 205.
69.
See id. at 208, 214; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
the patent test parameters).
70.
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
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entry or that it offered some procompetitive benefit to compensate for
the anticompetitive effect of the delay.7 1
The Third Circuit's decision represents a major departure from
established precedent in the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
allowing such transactions. 72 The Third Circuit decision varied most
from the Eleventh Circuit, which found in Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC that the exact same settlement at issue in the Third Circuit
decision was allowable under the scope of the patent test. 7 3 The
Schering-Plough court rejected the FTC ruling that stated that any
settlement in which "the generic receives anything of value and agrees
to defer its own research, development, production or sales activities"
is an unlawful restraint of trade.7 4 Instead, the court reasoned that
neither the rule of reason nor per se analysis applied for an agreement
involved a patent, so long as the agreement remained within the
patent's scope.7 5 The court reasoned that "[b]y their nature, patents
create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple
competition," and therefore the anticompetitive nature is present by
force of law.76 Instead of the traditional antitrust analysis, the court
created and applied a new test that "requires an examination of: (1)
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope, and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects." 77 Applying this test to the reverse-payment
settlements for the K-Dur drug, the court found that the settlement
agreements had no improper anticompetitive effect.78

Merck filed a petition for a writ of certiorari at the Supreme
Court.
Further increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court review,
just two days after the Third Circuit delivered its game-changing
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc to the
dismissal of the FTC's challenge to reverse-payment settlement in
80
This provided the FTC the
FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.
incentive to petition for certiorari in Watson, especially since the FTC
is now armed with the Third Circuit's K-Dur decision invalidating
79

71.
See id.
72.
See id. at 211-14.
73.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075-76 (11th Cir. 2005).
74.
Id. at 1062, 1065-66.
Id.
75.
76.
Id. at 1065-66.
77.
Id. at 1066.
See id. at 1068, 1076.
78.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., No. 12-245
79.
(U.S. Aug. 24, 2012), 2012 WL 3645102.
80.
FC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303-05, 1315 (11th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom, FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 787 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
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reverse-payment settlements as anticompetitive. In December 2012,
8
1
the Supreme Court agreed to hear FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.
2. Sixth Circuit: Per Se Illegal Restraints on Trade
In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that reverse-payment settlements are per se unlawful because
they are unreasonable restraints on trade. 82 In this case, a generic
manufacturer, Andrx, refrained from marketing a generic version of
the drug in question, after it received ANDA approval, in exchange for
annual $40 million payments from the patent holder during the
delay. 83 After one year, the parties settled the infringement claim
against Andrx whereby Andrx received $89.83 million. 84 On June 23,
1999, a full year after Andrx could have marketed its generic drug on
the open market, Andrx finally released its version of the Cardizem
Drug, Cartia XT. 85 In other words, Andrx was paid to delay generic
entry while the litigation was pending and, as a bonus, was not forced
to sacrifice the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period it received with its
ANDA application once the litigation terminated. 86
Indirect consumers and other putative class representatives
challenged the agreements on antitrust grounds.8 7 The case reached
the Sixth Circuit on interlocutory appeal from the district court's
grant of summary judgment finding that the interim agreement was a
per se illegal restraint of trade.88 The Sixth Circuit emphatically
agreed, stating that "there is simply no escaping the conclusion that
the Agreement. . . was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the
entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of
trade."8 9
The court further noted that "it is one thing to take
advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but
another thing altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in
inhibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40
million per year to stay out of the market."90 HMR argued that Andrx
would have remained out of the market even without the settlement

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Stempel, supra note 26.
332 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id.
See id. at 901-03.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 908.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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for fear of damages from the pending patent infringement litigation.9 1
The court rejected this notion, reasoning that "had HMR been
confident of the independent durability of its patent and the validity of
its infringement claim, it would not have paid $89 million to effect
what the patent and infringement suit had already accomplished."92
Therefore, the court saw no reason for the agreement other than
reducing competition. 93
3. Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits: Lawful Per Scope of the
Patent Test
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, the Second
Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit's and the FTC's per se rule and held
that reverse-payment settlements do not violate antitrust laws where
they fall within the exclusionary zone of the patent. 94 In other words,
the Second Circuit adopted the scope of the patent test.95 This case
involved a reverse-payment settlement in the patent infringement
case over Tamoxifen, a cancer drug. 96 Barr Laboratories, the generic
manufacturer, agreed to delay marketing its generic drug until after
the expiration of Zeneca, Inc.'s patent on Tamoxifen in exchange for
$66 million in cash payments to Barr and its supplier, as well as a
nonexclusive license to sell its off-brand drug.97
The parties also
agreed to move to vacate the district court's judgment. 98
Various consumers and consumer groups challenged the
The district court
settlement on antitrust and other grounds.99
rejected the plaintiffs challenges to the settlement and granted the
On appeal, the Second Circuit
defendant's motion to dismiss.10 0
affirmed the district court's ruling, underscoring a long-standing
policy in favor of settlement, including in patent and other intellectual
property cases. 101 The court stated that disallowing settlements may
"heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay
innovation." 1 02 Further, the court rejected the notion that settlements
allow weak patents to wrongfully survive litigation, while noting that
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 915.
Id.
See id.
466 F.3d 187, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2005).
See id. at 213.
Id. at 190.
See id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 202-03, 221.
Id. at 203.
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it would be impossible and improper for the court to engage in an ex
post analysis of how "the judicial system will lead to any particular
result in [a] case."1 0 3

Furthermore, the court "decline[d] to conclude . . that reverse
payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act," particularly in
light of its acceptance of the assertion that "reverse payments are
particularly to be expected in the drug-patent context because the
Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages them."1 0

4

The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the fact that the
reverse payments seem to far exceed the actual value of the generic
drug automatically makes the transaction an illegal restraint on
trade. 0 5 The court stated that "so long as the patent litigation is
neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to
arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is
presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and
distribution of the patented product."10 6 Though the court admits that
this policy may allow some additional protection for weak patents, it
took solace in its assumption that the weakest and least deserving of
patents would be attacked by multiple would-be generic entrants and
therefore would be unable and unwilling to buy out every potential
rival. 107
Finally, the court held that the terms of the settlement did not
unlawfully exceed the scope of the Tamoxifen patent. 0 8 Because the
settlement permitted other generic manufacturers to challenge the
patent and did not restrict access to unrelated or noninfringing
products, the court found that the settlement was actually well within
the confines of the monopoly rights presumptively granted to the
patent owner. 0 9 Importantly, the court distinguished the Sixth
Circuit's Cardizem agreement from the Tamoxifen agreement,
averring that the Cardizem agreement was much more restrictive. 110
The Eleventh Circuit continued the trend of favoring patent
rights over antitrust concerns in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals."'
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC's case against Solvay
Pharmaceuticals and generic manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals,
103.
Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1990)).
104.
Id. at 206.
105.
See id. at 208-09.
Id.
106.
See id. at 211.
107.
108.
Id. at 213.
109.
Id. at 214-15.
110.
See id. at 215.
11.
See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303-05 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 787 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
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Par Pharmaceuticals, and Paddock Laboratories over the parties'
reverse-payment settlement agreement related to patents for
AndroGel-a testosterone replacement drug.11 2
Here, the
reverse-payment settlement included the following terms: (1) Solvay
pays Par and Paddock $10 million per year for six years, (2) Solvay
pays Par and Paddock an additional $2 million per year for the backup
manufacturing assistance, and (3) Solvay shares some of its AndroGel
profits with Watson. 113 The profit share payments were estimated to
be between $19 million and $30 million per year. 114
The court found that the agreement was legal, reaffirming
Eleventh Circuit precedent of using the scope of the patent test.115
The court noted that "absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the
patent, a reverse-payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack
so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent."1 16 The court rejected the FTC's
argument that the underlying patent had no exclusionary potential
because Solvay was not likely to prevail in the underlying
infringement claim against the generic companies, and therefore any
reverse payment that excluded competition from the market
necessarily exceeded the potential exclusionary scope of the patent." 7
The court wanted to avoid "deciding a patent case within an antitrust
case about the settlement of the patent case, a turducken task."" 8
The court also soundly rejected the FTC's fears regarding the
significant anticompetitive harms and misuse of both the patent
system and judicial system caused by the scope of the patent test; if
the patent is truly invalid, other generic manufacturers would have
incentive to jump into the fray because the patent holder would be
unlikely to share its profits with every challenger.1 19
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the
Federal Circuit ruled that the reverse payments being challenged did
not exceed the scope of the patent and therefore were presumptively
lawful.1 20 This case involved a reverse-payment settlement in the
patent infringement case over Ciprofloxacin (Cipro), a type of
antibacterial medication.121 Barr, the generic manufacturer, agreed to
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1315.
Id.
544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1327-28.
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delay marketing its generic drug until six months prior to the
expiration of Bayer AG's patent on Tamoxifen in exchange for $49
million up front and either a supply of Cipro for resale or an additional
$300 million in cash over seven years.122
Cipro consumers and consumer groups challenged the
settlement on antitrust and other grounds. 123 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed. 124 The court concurred that the agreement was legal
because the agreement did not exceed the scope of the patent or, as
described by the court, the "exclusionary zone" of the patent. 125 The
court reasoned that the agreement was merely meant to exclude Barr
from engaging in market activity that violates Bayer's sanctioned
monopoly rights as the patentee of Cipro.1 26 The court further noted
that public policy favors settlement, and that settlements of patent
infringement suits are commonplace and well accepted within the
patent framework. 127
Finally, the Federal Circuit, like the Second Circuit,
distinguished the agreement at hand from the Cardizem settlement.1 28
The court noted that the Cardizem settlement required the generic
manufacturer to refrain from manufacturing unrelated drugs, a
requirement which was outside of the patent's "exclusionary zone." 129
Though the court did not directly acknowledge that restrictions on the
generic manufacturers that are unrelated to the maintenance of the
patent rights would be per se illegal, it did suggest that their analysis
might differ under different circumstances. 1 30 In sum, while each of
the three courts of appeals grappled with slightly variant forms of
reverse-payment settlements with varying anticompetitive effects, the
courts all found such agreements lawful because the anticompetitive
effects ostensibly played no role in their analyses.1 3 1 Rather, these
courts narrowed their review to ensure that the patent was not
illegally extended through the agreements.1 32

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1329 n.5.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1335.
Id.
See id.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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D. Legislative Response: CongressionalSilence and Failureto Regulate
On February 9, 2012, Congress attempted to prevent
lawsuits.1 3 3
settlements
in
Hatch-Waxman
reverse-payment
Congressman Waxman and Congressman Rush introduced Protecting
Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012 (H.R. 3995) "[t]o
prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug
companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market, and for
other purposes."1 34
The bill prohibits reverse-payment settlements, defined as
agreements "resolving or settling a patent infringement claim" in
which an ANDA filer "receives anything of value." 13 5 The ANDA filer
agrees "not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell, for any
period of time, the drug" that is the subject of the ANDA and the
patent infringement lawsuit. 136 The bill makes an exception for
settlements where the only "value" received by the ANDA filer is the
ability to market the drug before expiration of the patents in the
infringement lawsuit or before expiration of "any other statutory
exclusivity that would prevent the marketing of such drug."1 37
Like its (failed) predecessors, H.R. 3995 specifies that
violations of its provisions will fall within the FTC's purview rather
than under the Sherman Act as an agreement in restraint of trade.1 38
This portion of the bill states that such an agreement will be
considered "an unfair and deceptive act or practice and an unfair
method of competition in or affecting interstate commerce" under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.139 The FTC is given
full rulemaking authority to implement these enforcement provisions
and the power to exempt agreements on a case-by-case basis that it
finds "to be in furtherance of market competition and for the benefit of
consumers."1 40 The bill also provides that an ANDA filer found to be
in violation of the reverse-payment provisions shall forfeit the 180-day
exclusivity period and that all agreements shall be filed with the DOJ
and the FTC.1 41

133.
(2012).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th Cong.
Id.
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(a)(2).
Id. § 2(b).
Id. § 2(c).
Id.
Id. § 3.
Id. §4.
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This bill does not differ significantly from past failed attempts
to regulate reverse payment and therefore is vulnerable to the same
critiques, particularly regarding the effect on generic manufacturers
and the significantly reduced incentives to file ANDA challenges
under Hatch-Waxman. 142 Generic applicants would need to consider
whether challenging branded drugs would be "worth it," given that
they might have to choose between litigating to the bitter end or be
forced to satisfy the FTC's concerns with any settlement they
contemplate. 143 Furthermore, because of the wide discretion that
would be granted to the FTC in enforcing the Act, its "concerns" may
be quite difficult to predict. 144
II. ANALYSIS: JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AT WAR

An agreement between competitors to divide markets or
allocate customers is per se illegal because "such agreements preclude
competition not only in pricing, but also with respect to quality,
service and other competitive stimuli." 145
A reverse-payment
settlement is, at its core, a market division that allocates customers
along a temporal axis (as opposed to traditional geological
boundaries).
And even if reverse-payment settlements are not
classified as market allocation schemes and therefore not subject to
per se illegality treatment, such agreements are unreasonable
restraints on trade because there is not a plausible net procompetitive
effect from the transaction, and it is therefore subject to antitrust
action. 146
Because the agreement is made in the context of a patent
infringement settlement, however, courts have protected such
agreements under a blanket of legitimacy in patent law. 147 But while
a patentee has a right to exclude its competitors from marketing its
patented product, their right to exclude can only be enforced by
bringing a patent infringement suit against the alleged infringer. A
reverse-payment settlement is essentially a patentee using corporate
142.
Note that H.R. 3995 was a reintroduction of H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009),
which was a reintroduction of H.R. 1902, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). Other failed attempts to
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to address the issue of pay-to-delay
settlements include (but are not limited to) Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369,
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong.
(2009). For the sake of clarity and efficiency, the Author's analysis will focus on H.R. 3995.
143.
See H.R. 3995 §§ 2(c), 3 (2012).
144.
See id. §§ 2-3.
145.
See 1 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:35 (4th ed. 2012).
146.
See id. § 4:37.
147.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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funds to maintain its right to exclude, not the judicial system
established to both test and protect patents. 148
A. Reverse-Payment Settlements as Market Allocation
Any agreement where competitors agree not to compete for
certain territories or certain customers is assumed to be harmful to
competition and can only be motivated by the intent to eliminate
competition.1 49 Therefore, the Supreme Court has ruled that such
agreements are per se illegal. 150 Agreements that are considered per
148.
The reverse-payment settlement, rather than serving as a legitimate product of
weighing the risks each party faces should the case move to trial, is merely a cover for an
inappropriate splitting of corporate profits gleaned from monopoly rents. Therefore, the
settlement actually undermines the role of the judiciary in determining whether a patent should
be given legal force. Patents are meant to be a shield to protect innovators from blatant
misappropriation of their inventions. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 437 (Vicki Been
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). The natural consequence of exercising the right to exclude is that the
patent's validity is tested in the courtroom; the shield should only be as strong as the patent
itself. See id. at 439.
The incentives driving reverse-payment settlements are almost unique to pharmaceutical
patents. This is because a grant of a pharmaceutical patent gives the patentee both legal and
economic monopoly power. See id. at 2; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS
AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 101 (2009). Legal monopoly power, the ability to be the only
player to market a specific invention, comes with every patent. See NARD, supra, at 2. However,
because most markets have a plethora of substitutes that can effectively compete with the patent
holder and despite holding legal monopoly power, most patent holders do not have an economic
monopoly. See id. at 2. Pharmaceuticals are unique because of the inherent lack of substitutes in
the market. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra, at 101. In fact, when a new drug is introduced, it may
create an entirely new market. See id. Therefore, when a patentee is granted a pharmaceutical
patent, in many cases this will also give them a de facto economic monopoly. In taking a practical
view of the patent holder's risk-benefit analysis, it is easy to see-given the enormity of
uncertainty that comes with actual litigation and the potential that the patent was wrongfully
granted given the weaknesses in the current patent-review process-why a patent holder would
agree to make such large payments to a patent challenger in the case of pharmaceutical patents.
Pharmaceutical patent holders engaging in reverse-payment settlements are effectively
using their patents as a sword, because they are able to pay potential challengers to remain out
of the market using the corporate profits earned by that patent-a patent that may not be valid.
The use of this kind of sword is uniquely available where having a patent produces both a legal
and economic monopoly, and the demand for the product is inelastic enough to produce
significant monopoly rents. Here, the patent holder refuses to use its shield by using its
monopoly rents-which are essentially excess corporate profits-to ward off its patent's
challengers. This is particularly effective within the Hatch-Waxman scheme because of the
ANDA filer's ability to "park" its grant and prevent other challengers from also using the ANDA
system to challenge the patent holder. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
For further discussion on the potential for patent exceptionalism in pharmaceutical patents,
see Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1597-604.
149.
Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1597-604.
150.
The Court reaffirmed that:
One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between
competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to
minimize competition. . . . This Court has reiterated time and time again that
are naked restraints of trade with no purpose
"[h]orizontal territorial limitations ...
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se illegal are taken out of the realm of rule of reason analysis because
history has emphatically demonstrated that the particular category of
transactions have a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue." 15 1
Traditionally, firms have allocated markets across geographical
boundaries. For instance, in United States v. Sealy, Inc., Sealy made
agreements with its licensees not to license other manufacturers or
retailers to sell Sealy products in the licensee's assigned territory in
exchange for the licensee's agreement to sell only within that
territory.
The Supreme Court held that this agreement was a
horizontal territorial restraint of trade, which is a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 152
A reverse-payment settlement is essentially an absolute and
unequivocal market allocation of the entire United States for a
specified period of time. 153 Market allocation occurs when competitors
agree not to compete with each other in particular geographic
markets, for particular customers, or within particular product
lines. 154 By allocating markets, competitors effectively "insulate
themselves from competition through collusion." 155 Therefore, courts
have determined that horizontal market allocations are per se illegal
because "[hlorizontal territorial limitations .

.

. are naked restraints of

except stifling of competition." Such limitations are per se violations of the Sherman
Act.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-09 (1972) (citations omitted); see also
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899).
151.
Justice Black outlined the Court's reasoning for adopting a per se approach for
certain transactions and business relationships. The Court found that:
[There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
152.
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967).
153.
See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 72 (2009).
154.
ANDREW I. CAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 128 (2d ed. 2008). A market allocation scheme "could not
effectively convey power over price unless the parties to the arrangement collectively possess
market power." Id. This Note assumes that the patent holder and the ANDA challenger has the
requisite market power because of the de facto economic monopoly that often accompanies a
pharmaceutical patent.
Id.
155.
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trade with no purpose except stifling competition."15 6 Although these
agreements do not divide the United States or world markets into
multiple geographic territories as in the archetypal market allocation
case, an allocation of 100 percent is no less an allocation than, say, 10,
35, or 60 percent. A court should not exclude a division of market
based on time from per se treatment merely because of the temporal
nature of the split. There is still a geographic dimension (a market
allocation of 100 percent of the entire United States), and the
demarcation based on time creates the same harmful effect on

competition. 157
The Sixth Circuit decided in Cardizem to consider a
reverse-payment settlement as a per se illegal market allocation
agreement, where the patent holder agreed to make large
compensatory payments to the generic manufacturer in return for its
agreement to delay marketing its generic drug prior to the outcome of
The settlement parties'
patent litigation between the parties.15 8
argument that the agreement was merely ancillary to protecting the
patent holder's rights was rejected as a matter of law because the
arrangement extended to all generic versions of the drug, regardless of
whether or not the drug actually infringed the patent. 159 Still, one
common argument against the general application of the Cardizem
rationale to other reverse-payment cases is that the particular
settlement in that case required the generic manufacturer to "park"
its generic exclusivity right granted through the ANDA process. 160

White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 263 (1963).
156.
157.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.2.
158.
159.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir. 2003). This
lawsuit developed from an attempt by a generic drug manufacturer, Andrx, to obtain FDA
approval of a generic version of Cardizem, the patent of which was held by Hoechst AG. 1
WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW

§ 5:5

(2013). Andrx filed its

ANDA to market the generic brand and Hoescht filed a patent infringement suit against Andrx.
Id. The suit triggered the statutory thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the generic brand to
give the court time to review the suit. Id. While the patent infringement suit was pending, the
FDA granted Andrx a provisional approval to market its drug. Id. This meant that because
Andrx was the first company to apply for generic marketing rights, it was granted a 180-day
exclusivity to market a generic drug alternative to Cardizem, should the court decide that the
Cardizem patent was not infringed by the generic version or was invalid. Id. After the FDA's
provisional approval, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement where Hoechst would
pay Andrx $10 million every quarter until the patent litigation concluded, and Andrx would
delay marketing any bioequivalent of Cardizem. Id. After the thirty-month stay elapsed, the
FDA provisional approval was finalized, and Andrx was free to market its drug. Id. But Andrx
chose not to market the drug and took the $10 million quarterly payments. Id. Furthering the
anticompetitive effect was Andrx's 180-day exclusivity period; because the exclusivity period
began when Andrx started marketing its drug, other potential generics marketers were
prevented from marketing other bioequivalents of Cardizem. Id.
160.
See discussion supra note 50.
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The Cardizem court focused much of its analysis on this "parking" of
Andrx's generic exclusivity period, which essentially prevented other
generic manufacturers from marketing Cardizem bioequivalents,
extending the settlement agreement to cover potentially noninfringing
products. 161 The court analyzed the agreement as a whole, rather
than decrying the monetary payment from plaintiff to defendant as
per se illegal.1 62
Some commentators have used the court's holistic analysis to
assert that it is somewhat unclear whether the Sixth Circuit would
treat all reverse-payment settlements as per se illegal or if the
presence of the generic exclusivity holds would be necessary to trigger
per se illegality. 163 While the issue presented by generic exclusivity
parking enhances the net anticompetitive effect of reverse-payment
settlements, it is the allocation of the entire US market to the patent
holder that triggers per se illegality. Therefore, regardless of the term
requiring the generic manufacturer to refrain from exercising its
180-day exclusivity period, the Sixth Circuit could (and likely would)
have found the agreement per se illegal.
B. Reverse-Payment Settlements as Agreements that Presumptively
Reduce Competition
Even if reverse-payment settlements are not appropriately
categorized as market allocation-and are therefore not per se
illegal-they are likely still unreasonable restraints on trade under
the rule of reason analysis. The Sherman Act provides that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."1 64 Though the language is
broad, courts have construed the Sherman Act to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade, including per se violations such as
market allocations (which are presumptively unreasonable restraints
of trade), but also non-per se transactions that are restraints of trade
that lack sufficiently procompetitive justifications. 6 5
The unreasonableness of a trade restraint is determined by
applying the "rule of reason." 166 The rule of reason is not a set
standard of behavior, but a broad-spectrum analysis into whether the
161.

In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907-09.

162.

Id.

163.
See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 573 (2007).
164.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
165.
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-12 (1997).
166.
See id.
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challenged restraint "impos[es] an unreasonable restraint on
competition" under "all . . . the circumstances."1 67
The inquiry
includes balancing anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraint
as proven by the plaintiffs against the procompetitive effects of the
challenged restraint as proven by the defendant. 168 The plaintiff also
has the opportunity to prove that the procompetitive effects advanced
by the defendant are not sufficiently connected to the restraint itself,
specifically by showing that the restraint is not the least restrictive
means of obtaining the procompetitive benefit. 169
A traditional rule of reason analysis is ultimately an
unserviceable venture when reviewing reverse-payment settlements
involving large payments to a generic manufacturer in exchange for
total exclusion from the patent's market, because anticompetitive
harm is almost certain in these cases. 170 A patentee-the pioneer who
likely spent hundreds of millions of dollars 171 in researching and
developing the patented drug-naturally has little incentive to share
what it rightfully owns. The fact that the patentee is making a
substantial payment to the charged infringer suggests that there is
uncertainty regarding either the validity of the patent or whether the
charged infringer's product actually infringes on the patent; if the
patentee is confident in his right to exclude, the exclusion payment
should not exceed the patentee's expected costs of litigation. 172 These
large exclusion payments seem to exceed potential litigation costs,
however, particularly when settlement amounts exceed tens of
millions of dollars. 173 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
payments are anticompetitive because there was a significant enough
chance that the generic brand actually did have a right to compete,
thereby decreasing potential drug costs to retailers and consumers.
For this reason, a substantial exclusion payment in a patent
infringement settlement at least should be considered prima facie
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("[T]he factfinder
167.
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.").
168.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON 124-26 (1999).
Id. at 121-22.
169.
170.
See Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1568-73.
171.
See DiMasi et al., supra note 34, at 180 ("Including an estimate of the cost per
approved new drug for R&D conducted after approval increases total R&D cost to nearly
US$ 900 million.").
172.
See Shapiro, supra note 14, at 408.
173.
See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2012) (disputing
the settlement payment of $60 million); FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th
Cir. 2012) (detailing the settlement payment of $10 million per year for six years, plus profit
share estimated at $19-30 million per year), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012); In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing a settlement payment of $89.83
million).
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evidence of anticompetitive harm with no requirement to establish
further anticompetitive harm. The reasoning above justifies a strong
presumption (as opposed to prima facie evidence) of anticompetitive
harm, whereby defendants must provide compelling evidence of
significant procompetitive effects arising from the payment.
The pharmaceutical defendants in the reverse-payment
settlement cases discussed above all argued (1) the nature of the
settlements are not anticompetitive, (2) the patentee has the right to
enforce its patents through litigation and settlement, and (3) judicial
policy should favor settlements. 174 Some commentators have also
argued, however, that reverse-payment settlements might have
further procompetitive effects by allowing early entry of generic
brands into the market, as is often part of the settlement terms.17 5
But early marketing of a generic drug can be achieved through much
less restrictive means than a reverse-payment settlement ensuing
from a patent infringement suit. In fact, if the patentee granted a
licensing agreement, either within or outside of a settlement
agreement, the effect would actually be procompetitive, assuming the
licensing fees are not so exorbitant that the licensing agreement forces
the licensee to keep prices high.176
The Third Circuit's recent decision in K-Dur was based on
presumptive illegality under the rule of reason analysis rather than
per se illegality.1 77 In applying the quick-look rule of reason analysis,
rather than requiring the plaintiff to make a full-blown showing of the
agreements' anticompetitive effects, the court presumed that
reverse-payment settlements are unreasonable restraints on trade
and shifted the burden to the defendant to show procompetitive
justifications.1 78 By establishing this presumption, there is no need to
consider the merits of the underlying patent; the burden shifts directly
to the defendant to show a purpose other than delayed entry or to offer
a procompetitive benefit.
In rejecting the scope of the patent test and instead making a
quick-look rule of reason analysis, the Third Circuit explained that it
was "embrac[ing the Andrx] court's common sense conclusion that '[a]
payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm
174.
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharm., Inc. at 16-29, Watson Pharm., No.
12-416 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 5507198; Brief of Appellees in Nos. 10-2077, 10-2078,
10-2079 and Appellants in No. 10-4571 at 33-35, In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197 (Nos. 10-2077,
10-2078, 10-2079, 10-4571), 2011 WL 2603658.
175.
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 249-50
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
176.
See Holman, supra note 163, at 498-99.
177.
See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217-18.
See id. at 218.
178.
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may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties
entering the agreement . . . ."'179 The court further asserted that it
agreed with the FTC that there was no need to consider the merits of
the underlying patent suit because "[a]bsent proof of other offsetting
consideration, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the
payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the
litigation
an
otherwise
reasonable
date
that
represents
compromise."1 80
The presumption of unreasonableness is further bolstered by
the difficult burden placed on the defendant to rebut the
presumption. 181 Because a defendant must prove that the payments
were made in return for something other than delay of entry and
because the payments are usually substantial, the defendant is not
likely to meet this burden without actual significant concessions from
the generic manufacturer. 1 82 Additionally, these other concessions
must also pass antitrust muster. 183 The defendant may alternatively
show that the agreement actually increases competition, but the court
expressly noted that this is "probably rare." 1 84 The extraordinary
difficulty that a defendant faces in rebutting the presumption creates
a rule that will almost always have the same outcome as if the court
adopted the Sixth Circuit's per se treatment.
The Third Circuit's decision did not directly address an
important part of the Supreme Court's quick-look standard, which
requires that the quick look is appropriate only when "an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets." 185 But an observer with a basic
understanding of economics could likely deduce that less competition,
especially where a de facto economic monopoly is involved, would
Though commentators have
reasonably cause prices to increase.
argued that these settlements could ultimately have some competitive
benefits by allowing earlier entry into the market, the standard does
not call for an understanding of countervailing procompetitive
effects.1 86 It requires only that an observer could reasonably conclude

179.
Id. (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
180.
Id. (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005)).
181.
See id.
182.
See id.
183.
See id.
Id.
184.
185.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
186.
See id.
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that there would be an anticompetitive effect.' 8 7 Therefore, the Third
Circuit's application of the quick-look rule was not inappropriate.
C. The Improper Development and Application of the Scope of the
Patent Test
The concept of "scope" has been warped since Cardizem, albeit
slowly and subtly. The scope of the patent framework was first
established in Cardizem, in which the Sixth Circuit invalidated the
challenged agreement because it restrained activities beyond the scope
of the patent.1 8 8 The court left open the question of whether a patent
allows reverse-payment agreements encompassing only products and
activities covered by the patent through reverse payments. 8 9
But just because a settlement that reaches a product outside
the scope of the patent violates antitrust laws does not necessarily
mean that one falling within the facial scope of the patent is
automatically valid. The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits took
the framework established in Cardizem, meant to be applied to easy
and blatant cases, and used the scope of the patent test to make the
harder cases less fuzzy by changing the test to mean that any
agreement that does not involve products outside the patent scope
must be legal.1 90 This is an example of inverse error in logic, a fallacy
of propositional logic in which the negative of a true assumption is
incorrectly used to infer the negative of a true conclusion.1 91
Furthermore, the application of the warped Cardizem test
requires that the court assume the validity of the patent. 192 While
each court using the test denies that it is passing judgment on the
validity of the patent in question, the court must assume validity in
order to actually apply the test; if the patent is invalid, there is no
patent scope to consider.1 93 To apply the test, the court assumes that
mere issuance of a patent evinces patent validity.1 94 But empirical
studies have consistently shown that at least 40 percent of granted

187.
See id.
188.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir. 2003).
189.
See id.
190.
See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
191.
Gary N. Curtis, Denying the Antecedent, FALLAcY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/
denyante.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2012).
192.
See Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1602 n.181.
193.
See id. at 1560 (explaining that the value lies in determining the validity and scope
of the patent).
194.
Id. at 1602 n.181.
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patents that are litigated to decision are declared invalid. 195 The rate
of invalidity may be significantly higher in pharmaceutical patents, as
an FTC study found that, between 1992 and 2000, generics prevailed
in 73 percent of patent challenges. 196
Finally, the scope of the patent test is inappropriate because it
misapplies general infringement burden-of-proof principles. 197 A
patent serves as a shield rather than a sword for a patentee, and thus
the patentee has the ultimate burden to prove infringement in order
to exclude a competitor from marketing a challenged product.1 98 By
allowing the patentee to bypass its burden of proof by paying off a
challenger, the patent becomes a sword, generating profits that the
patentee may use to maintain an improper monopoly on a particular
market.1 9 9
D. The Insufficiency of Asserted Policy and Regulatory Justifications
for the Scope of the Patent Test
Each of the courts applying the scope of the patent test has
defended its application by referring to at least one of the following
justifications. The first and most common justification is the judicial
preference for settlement over litigation. 200 Courts have noted that
the "efficiency-enhancing" objectives should be considered, and
"[p]ublic policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without
litigation." 201 For example, in Schering-Plough, the court expressed

195.
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (showing that courts invalidated 46 percent of
patents between 1989 and 1996); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000) (showing that challenged
infringers prevailed in 42 percent of patent cases that reached trial between 1983 and 1999). But
see Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 33
n.61 (2006) (suggesting that infringer win rates are lower in more patent-heavy districts).
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 15, at 16.
196.
Key Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
197.
that "the [patentee] must show the presence" of infringing activity before an invalidity defense is
needed (citing Key Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 854 F.2d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); see also
Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1602 n.181 (stating that the Patent Act "has been interpreted ... to
require that an invalidity defense . . . be established by clear and convincing evidence, rather
than a mere preponderance").
See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[Tjhe
198.
patentee bears the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate infringement by a preponderance of
the evidence."); see also discussion supra note 149.
See discussion supra note 148.
199.
200.
See supra notes 101, 127 and accompanying text.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072-73 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Aro
201.
Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
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concern about the costs of litigation and overcrowded dockets. 202
Commentators have argued that the complex and technical nature of
patent infringement litigation may further compound the reflexive
preference toward settlement. 203
Courts have also expressed concern that establishing a
restrictive settlement rule could potentially reduce innovators'
incentives to research and develop new drugs. In Ciprofloxacin, the
court emphasized that a restrictive settlement rule could prevent
beneficial settlements 204 and undermine the innovator's incentives for
research, thereby harming consumers. 205
Furthermore, Judge
Posner's argument in dicta in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc.
has
influenced
the reverse-payment
debate:
"A ban on
reverse-payment settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge
patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options should he be
sued for infringement. . . ."206 Thus, Judge Posner suggests that
limiting settlement options would not only reduce the innovator's
incentives, but also reduce a potential challenger's incentive to both
innovate and challenge.2 07
Finally, courts have asserted that reverse-payment settlements
are rational byproducts of the Hatch-Waxman Act because the
regulatory scheme altered both the innovators' and generic
challengers' incentives. 208 Particularly, the court emphasizes that the
generic challenger faces little risk for potentially great rewards
because there is an incentive shift. 209 The Act allows the generic
manufacturer to infringe on the patentee's patent via certification. 2 10
Should the challenger lose in court, its loss is minimized to ANDA
202.
Id. at 1076.
203.
See Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1574; see also Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 n.20 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The cost and complexity of most patent
litigation is a familiar problem to the court system.").
204.
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256
205.
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
206.
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(Posner, J., sitting by designation).
Id.
207.
208.
The Eleventh Circuit noted:
Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the relative risk assessments and explains
the flow of settlement funds and their magnitude. Because of the Hatch-Waxman
scheme, [the generic manufacturers] gained considerable leverage in patent litigation:
the exposure to liability amounted to litigation costs, but paled in comparison to the
immense volume of generic sales and profits. This statutory scheme could then cost
[the innovator patentee] its patent.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
209.
See id.
210.
See id.
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application costs and litigation costs. 2 1 1 In Schering-Plough, the court
again quoted Judge Posner in Asahi: "Ifany settlement agreement can
be characterized as involving 'compensation' to the defendant, who
would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement.
If any settlement agreement is thus classified as involving a forbidden
'reverse payment,' we shall have no more patent settlements." 2 12
While there are certainly efficiency and incentive scheme
benefits to consider, these considerations should not automatically
antitrust
concerns
arising
from
reverse-payment
override
settlements. 2 13 Pharmaceutical patents are rare exceptions within the
patent world because they provide not only an exclusionary legal
monopoly (as every patent provides to its patentee), but also a de facto
economic monopoly in which the patentee has a "significant market
power." 2 14 The risk of antitrust abuse that accompanies an economic
monopoly establishes further justification for courts to more carefully
consider antitrust concerns in reverse-payment settlements of
pharmaceutical patent infringement suits.
Furthermore, while it is true that reverse payments are
rationalbyproducts of the Hatch-Waxman Act via shifting incentives,
it should not directly follow that such payments are legal
byproducts. 215 For example, the regulatory scheme governing public
utilities, government contracting, and gasoline distribution provides
natural incentives for participating firms to engage in price fixing. 216
However, should the firms engage in price fixing within the
established regulatory scheme, surely courts should not excuse the per
se illegal activity simply because the regulatory scheme provides
incentives to engage in those activities.217

211.
See id.
212.
Id. (quoting Asahi Glass Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994).
213.
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012).
214.
Where a firm has economic monopoly power, the firm is able to "price a product
above marginal cost without losing substantial sales." NARD, supra note 148, at 667. Patents
generally do not confer economic monopoly power because "there are usually viable substitutes
for the patented good." Id. at 618. The availability of substitutes creates additional competition
that applies pressure to a patent holder's pricing scheme, giving market incentives to price
according to the value of the innovation. Id. at 673. Consider pharmaceuticals, however, where
each new innovation has the potential to create a new market unto itself, thereby allowing a
patent to confer both legal and economic monopolies. Id. at 674-75.
215.
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 50, at 1758.
216.
See Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1577-78.
217.
See id.
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III. THE LIKELY SOLUTION: JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE
DOMINANT THEORY OF LAW

The Supreme Court has a basic question to answer: which body
of law trumps, patent or antitrust? The Court should answer this
2 18
While the
question in its review of FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.
circuit courts have debated this and generally fallen on one side or the
other, the best solution is one that recognizes the necessity for
antitrust regulation in which a patent grant provides the patentee
both a legal and economic monopoly. As such, judicial review of
reverse-payment settlements should be bifurcated, using the scope of
the patent to determine the demarcation between the different
analyses: (1) any part of the agreement that exceeds the scope of the
patent should be considered a per se illegal restraint on trade, 2 19 and
(2) any part of the agreement that falls within the scope of the patent
should be subject to rule of reason analysis, with a rebuttable
presumption of restraint of trade when anything of value exchanged
between the patentee and challenger exceeds potential costs of
litigation.
Per se treatment of agreement terms falling outside of the
scope of the patent is appropriate because such terms consistently
have anticompetitive effects by prolonging the period of higher drug
prices. Regardless of whether the patentee or the challenger benefits
from the extension, the results will be the same: consumers will
suffer. 220
For the parts of the agreement that fall within the scope of the
patent, such terms should be subject to rule of reason analysis, with a
rebuttable presumption of restraint of trade when anything of value
exchanged between the patentee and challenger exceeds potential
costs of litigation. This test is the most appropriate because it
recognizes that terms falling within the scope of the patent should be
open to use in negotiations by the patent holder. But such uses must
be limited in cases in which the patent holder also has complete
218.
FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
219.
When this Note refers to terms falling outside of the scope of the patent, it is
referring to the relatively small subset of terms that effectively extends the legal monopoly
period for any patented product. For example, if in exchange for large cash payments, the
challenger not only agrees to delay entry into the market for the challenged product, but also
agrees not to enter the market for related products (or gives exclusive rights to the patentee for
other drugs that may have been able to compete with other patents), the net effect will be that
competition is lowered in each relevant market. While it is true that restraint of trade may not
actually be the overriding reason for each of these agreements, the fact that such agreements
could be made under less suspicious circumstances, where there is an arguably better chance at
negotiating a fair deal, necessarily taints the agreement.
220.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 1-2.
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monopoly power. This test also gives the parties an opportunity to
demonstrate that the net effect of the agreement is procompetitive. 221
It is important to note, however, that this test is applicable only where
the patent grants the patent holder a de facto economic monopoly.
The scope of the patent test utilized by a majority of the federal
circuit courts is untenable. 22 2 The test originates from a logical fallacy
and ultimately an incorrect interpretation of the central ruling in
Cardizem, requires a presumption of patent validity, and misapplies
the burden of proof standards for infringement cases. 223 Furthermore,
the policy and regulatory concerns relied upon to justify the test do not
override the need for antitrust review, particularly due to the special
nature of pharmaceutical patents. 224

IV. THE BETTER SOLUTION: LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO PATCH THE
HATCH-WAXMAN LOOPHOLES
Congress is better situated to completely and decidedly address
the problems arising from the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Although
members of Congress have made multiple attempts to amend the
Hatch-Waxman Act to
address the
growing concern over
reverse-payment settlements, each attempt thus far has failed. 225 Bill
supporters and the FDA agree that congressional resolution is the
most appropriate measure to cure the unintended anticompetitive
effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 2 2 6 Throughout each attempt, the
amendments have remained nearly identical 227 and generally follow
the recommendations made by the FTC.
The crucial change within each of the proposed bills is that the
ANDA filer is prohibited from receiving "anything of value" in a patent

221.
For a fuller discussion, see supra Part II.B.
222.
See supra Part II.C.
223.
See supra Part II.C.
224.
See Hemphill, supra note 5, at 1597-604, for his discussion on the uneasy grounds
for patent exceptionalism in pharmaceutical patents.
225.
See supra Part I.D.
226.
See, e.g., The Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: Hearing on
H.R. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 189 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1706] (statement of
Joanne Handy, Board Member, AARP) (quoting Congressman Hatch, one of the original authors
of the Act, that he "find[s] these types of reverse payment collusive agreements appalling"
because Congress "did not wish to encourage situations where payments were made to generic
firms not to sell generic drugs"); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 15, at ii-xi (describing five
legislative amendments to address the provisions allowing abusive reverse-payment settlements
in the current version of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
227.
See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th
Cong. (2012); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong.
(2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, H.R. 1902, 110th Cong. (2007).
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infringement settlement agreement for the patent related to the filer's
particular ANDA drug. 2 2 8 This is the most critical amendment that
must be made to prevent reverse-payment settlements. Such an
amendment would effectively preclude the patentee and generic
manufacturer from engaging in a reverse-payment transaction,
because such payments would be "something of value." Critics of the
amendment claim that such a restriction is too broad and would cover
almost "any settlement agreement because a generic challenger
logically would only settle in exchange for something of value." 229 But
such broad language is necessary to prevent payments disguised as
ancillary deals without direct monetary value, which would otherwise
allow continued exploitation of the loophole that the amendment seeks
to repair. 230
Congress should also alter the 180-day exclusivity period
granted to the first ANDA filer. 2 3 1 This provision allows the ANDA
filer to "park" its exclusivity rights, preventing other generic
manufacturers from entering the market. 232 Section 4 of the proposed
legislation would force the ANDA filer and exclusivity-rights holder to
relinquish those rights should they enter into a prohibited settlement
agreement, including those that involve reverse payments. 233 A better
solution would be to allow successive ANDA filers to "wait in line" to
use the exclusivity period. If the first filer foregoes taking advantage
of the exclusivity period by accepting a substantial payment or
favorable licensing agreement from the patent holder, the next ANDA
filer should be given the opportunity to also challenge the patent
through the ANDA process. This would shift the incentives in the
patent infringement litigation brought by pharmaceutical patent
holders against ANDA filers, because the patent holder would know
that settling with one filer will only lead to a battle with the next filer.
By allowing successive ANDA filers to challenge the patent until the
first filer utilizes the exclusivity period, the patent holder will be
prevented from thwarting judicial testing of its patent's validity.
Finally, each of the proposed bills expressly delegated the
responsibility of reverse-payment settlement review to the FTC. 2 34

228.
E.g., H.R. 3995 § 2(a)(1).
229.
Hearing on H.R. 1706, supra note 226, at 206 (statement of Diane E. Bieri,
Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America).
230.
See Hearings on H.R. 1706, supra note 226, at 55 (statement of C. Scott Hemphill,
Associate Professor, Columbia Law School).
231.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
232.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
233.
H.R. 3995 § 4 (2012).
234.
Id. § 2(c).
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The amendment would subject reverse-payment settlements to per se
treatment as an "unfair and deceptive act or practice and an unfair
method of competition in or affecting interstate commerce prohibited
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act," thereby giving
the FTC complete review and enforcement responsibilities for every
such agreement. 235 This is not a critical change, but such a change
would be a decisive move against reverse-payment settlements. Given
the consistent negative view the FTC has taken toward
compelling FTC review would
settlements,
reverse-payment
effectively end the use of reverse-payment settlements.
These amendments, while imperfect, are the simplest and
cleanest way to reestablish the regulatory scheme intended by the
original passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. It closes the two main
loopholes that have caused the shift in incentives leading to the rise of
the reverse-payment settlement. By disallowing receipt of value for
intentional market-entry delay and requiring disgorgement of
exclusivity rights should such an agreement be made, the proposed
amendment would shift the incentives toward challenging weak
patents or settlement on terms advantageous to each party without
undue expense to the end consumer.
Still, Congress has attempted and failed three times to amend
the Act to close the loopholes. 236 But there is hope on the horizon for
another push to recalibrate the law. With the impending Supreme
Court review of FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Congress should
seek to preempt judicial interference to prevent potential judicial
warping of the purpose and effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act as
Furthermore, with the rampant
Congress originally intended.
increases in health care costs and the political quagmire arising from
the newly passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Congress has further incentives to reduce any additional cost to
consumers. Finally, with the heightened concern over federal budget
expenditures, the savings the federal government can expect by
passing the legislation may become a more prominent factor in the
bill's passage. 237

Id.
235.
See H.R. 3995; Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R.
236.
1706, 111th Cong. (2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, H.R. 1902,
110th Cong. (2007).
This Note assumes that the federal government stands to gain in Medicare and
237.
Medicaid expenditures with the increased availability of generic-brand medicines.
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V. CONCLUSION

With FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticalsslated to be decided by
June 2013, Congress has enough incentive to give due consideration to
a new proposal to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act. Congressional
correction of a congressional mistake would provide for a much more
stable solution to the reverse-payment phenomenon.
Instead of
having to review patent rights through an antitrust lens (or antitrust
principles within the patent paradigm), legislation can simply create a
bright line rule without making the difficult decision of which set of
principles trumps the other.
Furthermore, even given the past
failures to push any such legislation beyond committee review, the
time is ripe for Congress to take action because of the impending
Supreme Court review and the current political and fiscal
environment.
However, if Congress remains silent and does not pass
legislation closing the Hatch-Waxman loopholes, the Supreme Court is
poised to fill the void in its review of FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.
The Court should adopt the per se illegality treatment for any portion
of an agreement that extends beyond the scope of the patent. For
agreements that do not extend beyond the scope of the patent, where
anything of value is passed from plaintiff to defendant in settling a
pharmaceutical patent infringement suit, and such value exceeds the
cost of litigating the suit to a final judgment, such payments should be
prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.
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